The Ombudsman: Value of Expertise for Forecasting Decisions in Conflicts by Green, Kesten C. & Armstrong, J. Scott
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Marketing Papers Wharton School
May 2007
The Ombudsman: Value of Expertise for
Forecasting Decisions in Conflicts
Kesten C. Green
Monash University
J. Scott Armstrong
University of Pennsylvania, armstrong@wharton.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers
Postprint version. Published in Interfaces, Volume 37, Issue 3, May 2007, pages 287-299.
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.1060.0262
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/48
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Green, K. C., & Armstrong, J. S. (2007). The Ombudsman: Value of Expertise for Forecasting Decisions in Conflicts. Retrieved from
http://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/48
The Ombudsman: Value of Expertise for Forecasting Decisions in
Conflicts
Abstract
In important conflicts such as wars and labor-management disputes, people typically rely on the judgment of
experts to predict the decisions that will be made. We compared the accuracy of 106 forecasts by experts and
169 forecasts by novices about eight real conflicts. The forecasts of experts who used their unaided judgment
were little better than those of novices. Moreover, neither group's forecasts were much more accurate than
simply guessing. The forecasts of experienced experts were no more accurate than the forecasts of those with
less experience. The experts were nevertheless confident in the accuracy of their forecasts. Speculating that
consideration of the relative frequency of decisions across similar conflicts might improve accuracy, we
obtained 89 sets of frequencies from novices instructed to assume there were 100 similar situations. Forecasts
based on the frequencies were no more accurate than 96 forecasts from novices asked to pick the single most
likely decision. We conclude that expert judgment should not be used for predicting decisions that people will
make in conflicts. When decision makers ask experts for their opinions, they are likely to overlook other, more
useful, approaches.
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In important conflicts such as wars and labor-management disputes, people typically rely on the judgment of 
experts to predict the decisions that will be made. We compared the accuracy of 106 forecasts by experts and 169 
forecasts by novices about eight real conflicts. The forecasts of experts who used their unaided judgment were 
little better than those of novices. Moreover, neither group’s forecasts were much more accurate than simply 
guessing. The forecasts of experienced experts were no more accurate than the forecasts of those with less 
experience. The experts were nevertheless confident in the accuracy of their forecasts. Speculating that 
consideration of the relative frequency of decisions across similar conflicts might improve accuracy, we obtained 89 
sets of frequencies from novices instructed to assume there were 100 similar situations. Forecasts based on the 
frequencies were no more accurate than 96 forecasts from novices asked to pick the single most likely decision. 
We conclude that expert judgment should not be used for predicting decisions that people will make in conflicts. 
When decision makers ask experts for their opinions, they are likely to overlook other, more useful, approaches.  
Key words : applications; bargaining; behavior; competitive strategy; decision making; decision analysis;  
defense; effectiveness/performance; forecasting; foreign policy; leadership; military; organizational studies; 
strategy; tactics. 
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sking an expert to predict what will happen in  
 a conflict seems to be a reasonable thing to do. 
 
be made of executives in business, the public sector, 
and the armed services. 
For example, the media find professors and politi- 
cians to tell us what will happen when discussing  
conflicts such as the war on terrorism. In business, a  
CEO might ask the company’s marketing manager to  
predict competitor response to a new-product launch  
or ask the human resources manager whether offer- 
ing a two-percent wage increase will deter a threat- 
ened strike. In the military, a general might ask an  
intelligence officer if the enemy is likely to defend an  
outpost. 
Evidence from surveys suggests that forecasts of  
decisions in conflicts are typically based on experts’  
unaided judgments (Armstrong et al. 1987). Informal  
evidence that this is true abounds. Winston Churchill  
observed that a politician should have “The ability  
to foretell what is going to happen_ _ _ _ And to have  
the ability afterwards to explain why it didn’t hap- 
pen” (Adler 1965, p. 4). The same observation might 
1 
While it is attractive to think that if we can find 
the right expert we can know what will happen Arm- 
strong (1980), in a review of evidence from diverse 
subject areas, was unable to find evidence that exper- 
tise, beyond a modest level, improves an expert’s abil- 
ity to forecast accurately. 
 
Some Beliefs About the Value of 
Expertise 
What do people think about the value of expertise  
when forecasting decisions in conflict situations? Prior  
to giving talks about forecasting, we asked attendees  
for their opinions on the likely accuracy of experts’  
and novices’ (university students’) forecasts of deci- 
sions in conflicts. We told respondents that, for the  
purpose of our survey, they should assume that those  
asked to make predictions had been presented with  
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descriptions of several different conflicts and were 
asked to choose from between three and six possi- 
ble decisions such that the expected accuracy from 
choosing randomly across the full set of conflicts was 28 
percent. This percentage is the average chance of a 
correct prediction for the eight conflicts we used in  
our research, or  _1/6 + 1/4 + 1/4 + 1/4 + 1/3 + 1/3 + 
1/3 + 1/3_/8 ∗ 100. By asking respondents to adopt 
28 percent chance as the value of chance when they 
made their assessments, we are able to make 
meaningful comparisons between our research find- 
ings and their accuracy expectations. 
We conducted our surveys prior to giving talks to 
academics and students at Lancaster University (19 
usable responses), Manchester Business School (18), 
Melbourne Business School (6), Royal New Zealand 
Police College educators (4), Harvard Business School 
alumni (8),  conflict  management  practitioners  in 
New Zealand  (7),  and  attendees  at  the  Interna- 
tional  Conference  on  Organizational  Foresight  in  
Glasgow (15). A copy of our questionnaire is avail- 
able  at  www.conflictforecasting.com.  We  excluded  
27 responses from people who expected accuracy to  
be less than  28 percent for any method because it  
seemed implausible to us that the forecasts of any  
method would, on average, be worse than chance. If a  
method really were worse than chance, the forecaster  
could eliminate the decision predicted by the method  
and choose another one at random, thereby obtaining  
forecasts that were more accurate than chance.  
 Our practitioners, forecasting experts, and miscel- 
laneous academics had little faith in the judgment  
of  novices,  expecting their predictions to be accu- 
rate only  30  percent of the time—little better than  
chance. The respondents had greater confidence in  
experts—66 percent expected them to be more accu- 
rate than novices, whereas only 9 percent expected  
novices to be more accurate. Despite their greater  
faith in experts, respondents expected only 45 percent  
of experts’ forecasts to be accurate. If the responses  
we excluded were included, the average expectations  
would be 30 percent for novices and 42 percent for  
experts, rather than 30 percent and 45 percent, respec- 
tively. 
We suggest that accurate prediction is difficult be- 
cause conflicts  tend to be too complex for people  
to think through in ways that realistically represent 
 
 
 
 
and Armstrong: Value of Expertise for Forecasting Decisions in Conflicts 
Interfaces 00(0), pp. 1-12, © 2007 INFORMS 
 
their actual progress. Parties in conflict often act and  
react many times, and change because of their inter- 
actions. In addition, there may be interactions within 
each party, and there may be more than two parties 
involved. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) suggested that when  
people are faced with complex situations, they are  
likely to resort to the heuristic of availability to judge 
the likelihood of outcomes. That is, they test their  
memories and judge an outcome likely when they can  
easily recall or imagine a similar one. For example, 
some people tend to think it likely that new wars will  
end badly because they have a vivid memory of the  
unceremonious withdrawal of US and allied troops 
from Vietnam (Kagan 2005). There is, however, ample  
reason to be skeptical about whether the availability  
heuristic will lead to accurate predictions. For exam- 
ple, salient outcomes and the situations that gave rise  
to them are unlikely to be representative. Unstruc- 
tured reviews of the past are likely to offer poor guid- 
ance for the future (Fischhoff 1982, Harvey 2001).  
 How people process information is problematic. If  
we take Bayes’s theorem as the standard, people tend  
to adjust their predictions less than they should when  
they receive new information (Edwards 1982). When  
they consider the likelihood of an outcome from a  
multistage process (e.g., Hitler invades Belgium, he  
succeeds, Britain declares war, Hitler attacks Britain),  
people have the opposite tendency: they act as if their  
best guesses of what will happen at early stages are  
certainties (Gettys et al. 1982). 
Stewart (2001) found that judgmental forecasts are 
likely  to  be  unreliable  when (1)  the  task  is  com- 
plex, (2) there is uncertainty about the environment,  
(3) information acquisition is subjective, or (4) infor- 
mation processing is subjective. Problems of the type 
we are considering are likely to meet Stewart’s four 
conditions for unreliability. 
It  is  difficult  for  people  to  improve  at  predict- 
ing decisions in  conflicts  using  unaided judgment  
because basic conditions for learning are typically 
absent. Timely and unambiguous feedback is uncom- 
mon, and opportunities for practice are rare (Arkes  
2001). Feedback may include misleading information 
that an adversary has disseminated or the unreliable  
accounts of witnesses. Accurate feedback may be mis- 
interpreted because experts have misunderstood the  
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situation (Einhorn  1982). Decision makers may act 
to avoid a predicted outcome, thereby confounding  
feedback. Conflicts often occur over long periods of  
time, and those responsible for predicting an outcome  
may no longer be present when the actual outcome  
occurs. Many experts rarely face important conflicts.  
For  those  who do, each conflict  may  be  unique.  
Experts can readily construct spurious correlations to  
support their theories (Chapman and Chapman 1982,  
Jennings et al. 1982). 
Finally, Tetlock (1999) found that experts have ex- 
cellent defenses against evidence that their forecasts  
were wrong so that even in situations where condi- 
tions for learning are good, experts may still fail to  
learn. 
Robert McNamara (Morris 2003), Secretary of De- 
fense  under Presidents  Kennedy and Johnson, re- 
ferred to the “fog of war ” in relation to conflicts in  
which he was involved. We suggest that this term,  
which appears to have originated in the writings of  
Prussian Major General Carl von Clausewitz in 1832  
(von Clausewitz 1993), might reasonably be applied  
to most conflict situations in which decision makers  
use their unaided judgment to make predictions. 
Research Method 
We recruited domain experts, conflict experts, and  
forecasting experts to predict the decisions made in  
eight  diverse conflicts.  The  conflicts  were  real  sit- 
uations for which accurate forecasts might reason- 
ably have been expected to save money or lives.  
We disguised  conflicts  that  were  not  obscure  to  
make recognition of the real situation unlikely. We  
chose conflicts  for  their  diversity  and  because  we  
could get good information about them. The con- 
flicts  involved  nurses striking for pay parity, foot- 
ball players seeking a bigger share of revenues, an  
employee resisting the downgrading of her job, artists  
demanding public financial support, a novel distri- 
bution arrangement that a manufacturer proposed to  
retailers,  a hostile takeover attempt, a controversial  
investment proposal, and nations preparing for war.  
Each involved two or more interacting parties. The  
materials we used in our research are available on  
conflictforecasting.com. 
We allocated the conflicts to  expert  participants  
based on their expertise. For example, we sent conflicts 
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between employers and employees to industrial-rela- 
tions specialists,  and  we sent all eight conflicts to  
conflict-management experts. Because we used e-mail 
to contact participants, we had no control over how  
much time they spent on the task, or whether they  
referred to other materials or consulted other people. 
We recruited novices to make predictions for the  
same situations (Green 2005) and provided them with  
the same materials. Rather than sending them the 
material by e-mail, we paid the students to make their  
predictions while they sat in lecture theatres. We did  
not attempt to match students’ knowledge and expe- 
rience with the subject matter of the conflicts. Unlike  
the experts who had discretion over the conflicts for  
which they made predictions, the students were paid 
only when they had provided forecasts for all of the 
conflicts that we had allocated to them. 
 
Obtaining the Forecasts 
For each conflict, we provided participants with a set  
of between three and six decision options. We gave  
them no instructions on how they should make their 
predictions. 
The way in which a problem is posed often affects  
judgmental predictions. One important distinction is  
whether a problem is framed as a specific instance 
or a class of situations. For example, one might ask,  
“How probable is it that the US will sign the Kyoto  
Protocol?” Alternatively, one could frame the problem 
as, “In what proportion of cases would the US sign a  
treaty that would cause certain harm to the nation’s  
interests in return for uncertain benefits?” Kahneman 
and Tversky (1982a, b) proposed that, whereas people  
tend to think of situations as being “singular ” when  
they assess the likelihood of outcomes (e.g., Kyoto 
Protocol signature), their predictions would be more  
accurate if they used a “distributional” approach (e.g.,  
international treaty signatures) to assess likelihood. 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) used the term “outside  
view” when they presented evidence on the superior- 
ity of a distributional approach. Tversky and Koehler 
(1994) postulated that the greater accuracy is a result  
of peoples’ tendency to consider alternatives in more  
detail. They suggested that people are prompted to 
think more about different ways that an outcome  
might occur when a problem is framed as a class of  
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similar situations than when it is framed as a singular  
instance. Cosmides and Tooby (1996) found evidence  
for the proposition that people have innate mecha- 
nisms for storing and manipulating frequency infor- 
mation. 
We conducted an experiment to compare the accu- 
racy of unaided judgment forecasts collected using  
a  singular  format  with  those  collected  by  asking  
for frequencies of different decisions across a set of  
hypothetical similar situations. We hypothesized that  
participants who were asked for frequencies might  
provide forecasts that were more accurate than those  
who were not. 
We paid 52 university students the equivalent of  
US$20 to take part in the experiment and allocated  
them randomly between the singular and frequen- 
cies  treatments. Each singular-treatment participant  
received a different sequence of four of the eight con- 
flicts that we used in our research; we gave matching  
sequences to the frequencies-treatment participants.  
We allowed participants approximately 30 minutes to  
read the material and answer the questions for each  
conflict. 
Four participants each claimed to recognize a sit- 
uation, and we excluded their responses. With the 
exception of the following forecasting questions, the 
treatments were identical. 
Singular treatment question: 
How was the standoff between Localville and Ex- 
pander resolved? (check one   or %) 
(a)  Expander ’s takeover bid failed completely.  
 (b) Expander purchased Localville’s mobile opera- 
tion only. 
(c)  Expander ’s takeover succeeded at, or close to, 
their August 14 offer price of $43 per-share.  
 (d) Expander ’s takeover succeeded at a substantial  
premium over the August 14 offer price. 
Frequencies treatment question: 
Assume that there are 100 situations similar to the 
one described. In how many of these situations 
would _ _ _ 
(a)  The takeover bid fail completely?  out of 100 
(b) The  mobile  operation  alone  be  purchased? 
out of 100 
(c)  The takeover succeed at, or close to, the offer  
price?  out of 100 
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(d) The takeover succeed at a substantial premium  
over the offer price?  out of 100 
Findings 
Expert vs. Novice Judgment 
Our survey respondents expected experts’ unaided- 
judgment forecasts to be substantially more accurate  
(45 percent) than those of novices (30 percent). This 
expectation was not borne out. The unaided experts’  
forecast accuracy averaged only 32 percent across the  
conflicts  used in our studies, little  better  than  the 
average accuracy of 29 percent for novices’ forecasts  
(Table 1). Neither group did appreciably better than  
chance. These results are consistent with evidence that 
Armstrong summarized (1985, pp. 91-96).  
 We used the permutation test for paired replicates  
(Siegel  and Castellan  1988) to test the significance  
of the differences in accuracy between experts and  
chance across the eight conflicts. As a casual inspec- 
tion of the data in Table 1 suggests, the differences  
are quite likely to have arisen by chance (P = 0_30,  
one-tail test). The test is 100 percent power-efficient  
because it uses all the information (Siegel and Castel- 
lan 1988, p. 100). 
Expert Experience and Accuracy 
Is it possible to identify experts who are more likely  
than others to make accurate judgmental forecasts?  
One way to assess this is to compare the accuracy of 
forecasts by more-experienced experts with the accu- 
racy of less experienced experts. 
We asked expert participants to record their years  
of experience as “a conflict management specialist.” 
 
 
Chance  By novices  By experts 
 
Artists protest  17  5 (39)  10 (20) 
Distribution channel  33  5 (42)  38 (17) 
Telco takeover  25  10 (10)  0 (8) 
55% pay plan  25  27 (15)  18 (11) 
Zenith investment  33  29 (21)  36 (14) 
Personal grievance  25  44 (9)  31 (13) 
Water dispute  33  45 (11)  50 (8) 
Nurses dispute  33  68 (22)  73 (15) 
Averages (unweighted)  2829 (169)  32 (106) 
 
Table 1: We show the percentage accuracy of unaided judgment forecasts 
(numbers of forecasts are in parentheses).  
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As a check, we also asked some of our novice par- 
ticipants the same question. Their responses were as 
expected: 94 percent of the university-student partic- 
ipants who answered the question reported that they 
had no experience; the rest claimed one or two years 
of such experience. 
Common sense expectations did not prove to be 
correct.  The 57  forecasts of experts with less than 
five years experience were more accurate (36 percent) 
than the 48 forecasts of experts with more experience 
(29 percent). 
We also asked our expert participants to rate their  
experience with conflicts similar to the one they were  
examining using a scale from 0 to 10. Those who con- 
sidered they had little experience with similar con- 
flicts (they gave themselves ratings of 0 or 1) were as  
equally accurate at 34 percent (72 forecasts) as those  
who gave themselves higher ratings (32 forecasts). 
 
Expert Confidence and Accuracy 
We wondered whether experts’ confidence in their in- 
dividual forecasts could be used to identify accurate 
forecasts. On the other hand, their confidence might 
be misplaced when the forecasting problems are dif- 
ficult. We asked our expert participants: 
How likely is it that taking more time would change 
your forecast? 
{0 = almost no chance  _1/100_ _ _ _ 10 = 
practically  
certain _99/100_}  0-10. 
While it is possible that the experts might have rea- 
soned that they were unlikely to change a forecast  
given more time because they did not expect their  
forecast to be better than guessing, the fact of their  
participation and our evidence on accuracy expecta- 
tions suggests that this was not the case. We interpret  
the experts’ responses to this question as a measure of  
their confidence in the accuracy of their forecasts. We  
compared the accuracy of forecasts in which experts  
had high confidence with those in which they had  
less confidence. When experts assessed the likelihood  
that they would change their forecasts if given more  
time as between 0 and 2 out of 10, i.e., no more than  
0.2 probability of change, we coded the forecasts as  
“high confidence.” All other forecasts we coded as  
“low confidence.” Using unweighted averages across  
the conflicts, the 68 high-confidence forecasts were less 
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accurate (at 28 percent) than the 35 low-confidence 
forecasts (at 41 percent). 
We also compared the confidence that the experts  
expressed in their forecasts that turned out to be accu- 
rate  with their confidence in forecasts that turned 
out to  be  inaccurate.  There  were  six  conflicts  for  
which we had both accurate and inaccurate fore- 
casts and for which there were no half-accurate fore- 
casts (the “distribution channel” conflict offered the  
option “c. Either a or b” and we coded the nine such  
responses as 0.5). Using unweighted averages across 
the six conflicts, we found that the experts assessed  
the probability that they would change the 27 accu- 
rate forecasts as 0.25, and that they would change the 
51 inaccurate forecasts as 0.17, again showing a lack 
of relationship between confidence and accuracy. 
 
Frequency Responses and Accuracy 
We expected that forecasts would be more accurate  
when we asked our participants to estimate the fre- 
quencies of outcomes for many similar situations. Our 
university-student participants who judged relative  
frequencies were no better at identifying the actual  
decision than were those who simply chose the deci- 
sion they thought most likely. Averaged across con- 
flicts, 33 percent of forecasts from both the frequencies  
and singular treatments were accurate (Table 2). Fur- 
ther, the accuracy figures for the two groups appear  
to follow the same pattern when looking across the  
situations—Spearman rank-order correlation  coeffi- 
cient 0.59, P < 0_10 (Siegel and Castellan 1988). 
Of the 89 frequencies predictions, 54 percent sum- 
med to the total of 100 that was specified in the fre- 
quencies-treatment question; 35 percent totaled more 
 
Chance   Frequencies    Singular  Total 
 
55% pay plan  25  0 (12)  9 (11)  4 (23) 
Artists’ protest  17  10 (10)  0 (11)  5 (21) 
Distribution channel  33  23 (13)  38 (13)  31 (26) 
Personal grievance  25  11 (9)  46 (13)  32 (22) 
Telco takeover  25  50 (12)  25 (12)  38 (24) 
Zenith investment  33  40 (10)  42 (12)  41 (22) 
Water dispute  33  67 (12)  42 (12)  54 (24) 
Nurses’ dispute  33  64 (11)  58 (12)  61 (23) 
Averages (unweighted)  28  33 (89)  33 (96)  33 (185) 
 
Table 2: We show the percentage accuracy of novices’ frequency and sin- 
gular forecasts (numbers of forecasts are in parentheses).  
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than 100, and 11 percent less than 100. It is arguable  
that,  despite  our  intentions,  the  decision  options  
we provided were not entirely mutually exclusive  
or exhaustive, and the failure of some participants’  
responses to add to 100 is not necessarily a failure  
of logic on their part. On the other hand, researchers  
have found that even with mutually exclusive and  
exhaustive lists of events, responses do not consis- 
tently sum to 1.0 or 100 percent because people com- 
monly fail to interpret probability or frequency scales  
in ways that researchers intend (Windschitl 2002).  
 Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that our  
participants, who in most cases had only three or  
four decision options to assess, allocated frequencies  
that were at least consistent with their ranking of the  
options’ likelihoods. For our analysis, therefore, we  
used the decision with the highest frequency or prob- 
ability, or the single decision chosen, as the forecast.  
We dropped 10 observations in which there was a tie.  
 When we excluded responses that did not sum to  
1.0 or 100, it did not change our conclusion that ask- 
ing participants for frequencies did not improve accu- 
racy. Across the conflicts, the average accuracy for  
frequencies responses was 29 percent (48 forecasts)  
compared with 32 percent (93 forecasts) for singular- 
treatment responses. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The people we surveyed expected that forecasting 
decisions in conflicts would be difficult. Our find- 
ings confirmed this. Most respondents nonetheless ex- 
pected experts to be better forecasters than novices. 
They were wrong. Expertise did not improve accu- 
racy.  Neither experts nor novices did substantially 
better than guessing. 
Our concerns that our instructions to participants  
might have harmed accuracy proved unfounded: ask- 
ing for an assessment of the relative frequency of  
decisions across similar situations did not help. An  
analysis using only responses that conformed to the  
norms of probability theory led to the same conclu- 
sion. We suggest that the complexity of conflict sit- 
uations means that people tend to view each one as  
more-or-less unique and, therefore, do not store or  
recall frequency information in the way that they do  
for simpler situations such as rainy days in April, or  
the presence of speed cameras on their routes to work. 
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There are no good grounds for decision makers  
to rely on experts’ unaided judgments for forecast- 
ing decisions in conflicts. Such reliance discourages 
experts and decision makers from investigating alter- 
native approaches (Arkes 2001). 
While it  is  difficult  to  accurately  forecast  deci- 
sions in conflict situations, we have shown in Green  
(2005) and Green and Armstrong (2004) that it is pos- 
sible  to  obtain substantially better forecasts. Green  
(2005) found that simulated interaction, a type of role  
playing for forecasting behavior in conflicts, reduced 
error by 47 percent when compared with game-theory  
experts’ forecasts. (Role players were mostly under- 
graduate students.) In Green and Armstrong (2004), 
we asked experts to recall and analyze information  
on similar situations from the past using a method  
we called structured analogies. When experts were able 
to think of at least two analogies, forecast error was  
reduced by 39 percent compared to chance accuracy.  
 While expert  advisors  and  political  leaders  use 
unaided judgment to forecast, it is unreasonable to  
accuse them of bad faith when their predictions about  
conflicts prove wrong. We should expect inaccurate 
predictions when experts use unaided judgment to 
forecast how people will behave in conflicts. 
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Comment: Combating Common Sense and Meeting  
 Practitioner Needs  
 
Shelley A. Kirkpatrick  
Homeland Security Institute, 2900 South Quincy Street, Suite 800, Arlington, Virginia 22206, shelley.kirkpatrick@hsi.dhs.gov 
Green and Armstrong discuss the accuracy of twoforecastingmethods—simulatedinteractionand 
structured analogies. This study, in conjunction with  
their previous research, provides compelling evidence  
that each of these methods yields more accurate fore- 
 
casts than experts’ unaided judgment (Green 2002, 
Green and Armstrong 2004). 
I am a principal analyst at the Homeland Security In- 
stitute (HSI). The views I express in this article are my  
ownanddonotnecessarilyreflect HSIopinionorpolicy.  
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In my experience as a scientist practitioner who has 
worked with the intelligence, defense, and homeland 
security (IDHS) communities to assess the behavior 
of adversary groups and leaders, I have encountered 
many perspectives on expert judgment. To illustrate, I 
describe three views. 
(1)  Experts can address all problems: This is the  
view that we can accurately address national and  
homeland security issues,  including  conflict  situa- 
tions, by asking experts. Sometimes, we ask a group  
of  experts  to  arrive  at  a  group  forecast.  Other  
times, we seek a range of viewpoints, e.g., to iden- 
tify new vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure. We  
seek expertise using many methods, including focus  
groups, panel discussions, conferences, meetings, and  
informal interactions. 
(2)  We cannot forecast all problems: Some problems  
are undefined or too complex, or we lack expertise  
about them. This is related to the view that, because  
experts are not always right, we should consult many  
experts. When one must consult an expert—such as  
when there is little objective data available and small  
changes in the environment—it is recommended that  
many, rather  than  few  experts  be  asked  to  pro- 
vide a judgment (Armstrong 1985). However, experts  
typically do not provide decision makers with quan- 
titative forecasts, thus forcing decision makers to inte- 
grate a variety of qualitative viewpoints.  
 (3)  We can model and forecast problems: Rather  
than relying on expert judgment, we can use model- 
ing to quantify problems and yield a forecast. Quan- 
titative modeling approaches often assume that the  
individuals we model operate with perfect rationality.  
For example, research has yielded no evidence that  
terrorists are mentally ill. However, rationality from a  
terrorist’s perspective usually differs from rationality  
as perceived by a US citizen (Sageman 2004). Clearly,  
we cannot model all problems. Thomas Schelling,  
winner of a Nobel prize in economics for his work  
on game theory, states that game theory is less use- 
ful for analyzing how to deter terrorists from using  
nuclear weapons because “it is difficult to figure out  
what their objectives are” (Henderson 2005). Still, it  
is possible to apply current forecasting principles to  
the problem of terrorism (Green 2004). According to  
Heuer (1999), there is no failure to collect intelligence  
data, only failure to analyze it. 
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I present some ideas on the value of unaided expert 
judgment, and then follow with suggestions for future 
research to help practitioners develop forecasts. 
 
Combating Common Sense 
Examples abound of common-sense ideas that research  
does not support. The use of unstructured interviews  
to select new employees (Schmidt and Zimmerman  
2004) is one illustration. In an unstructured interview,  
the interviewer asks different questions of different  
applicants or asks the same questions in a different  
order. In a structured interview, the interviewer asks  
all applicants the same questions, in the same order.  
The interviewer usually  determines the questions,  
which are all intended to determine job-relevant abil- 
ities. 
Research, including several meta-analyses, on un- 
structured  interviews  consistently  finds  it  to  be  
less  accurate  than  structured  interviews (Huffcutt 
and Arthur 1994,  McDaniel  et  al. 1994,  Wiesner 
and Cronshaw 1988) in predicting job performance.  
Despite these findings, interviewers commonly use  
the unstructured interview for several reasons. First,  
managers like unstructured interviews because they  
require little or no preparation. Second, managers fre- 
quently have already decided that the applicant is  
qualified but want to appraise qualities, such as com- 
munication skills, that are not always apparent on a  
resume. Third, applicants expect unstructured inter- 
views and are familiar with an unstructured format.  
 Extrapolating from this example, we can find clues  
on why relying on expert judgment seems reasonable.  
I present these ideas to explain why the findings of  
Armstrong and Green appear counterintuitive, not to  
argue against their findings: 
—Decision makers can engage experts  in  two- 
way conversation. Such dialogue enables experts to 
explain their forecasts and decision makers to im- 
prove their understanding of the problem. 
—Experts  can  determine  the  decision  maker ’s 
requirements,  making  future  interactions  with  the 
decision maker more efficient. 
—Experts are thought to arrive at forecasts, espe- 
cially of new problems, quickly. Compared to an em- 
pirical  study  or  analytical  process,  experts  simply  
arrive  at  a  judgment or decision; they do not go  
through an empirical process of designing a study,  
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collecting  data,  performing  analyses,  and  drawing 
conclusions. Structured methods require time for data 
collection, analysis, interpretation of results, and com- 
munication of findings to the decision maker. 
—The use of trusted experts enhances the fore- 
cast security and secrecy. Structured methods may re- 
quire the involvement of more people, and results 
obtained  from software-based  forecasting  methods 
can be copied and stolen. Even knowledge of forecast- 
data requirements can provide an adversary with in- 
formation about the forecast. 
—It is difficult to question or challenge a forecast  
without knowing how the expert arrived at it. Deci- 
sion makers who prefer an expert approach or trust  
the judgment of a particular expert are often unlikely  
to ask the expert for an explanation of the judgment.  
Indeed, the expert may not be able to explain all of  
the factors considered in making the judgment.  
 It is difficult to convince people that their common- 
sense ideas are wrong. Rather than trying to do so,  
perhaps we should try to give decision makers a bet- 
ter understanding of the real value of unaided expert  
judgment. For example, such judgments may be use- 
ful in improving the decision maker ’s understanding  
of a forecasting situation but not helpful when a spe- 
cific forecast is required. 
Meeting Practitioner Needs 
I  believe  that  Green  and  Armstrong  are  a  posi- 
tive  example  of  researchers  who  strive  to  create 
new and useful knowledge for practitioners. Their 
websites (www.conflictforecasting.com  and  www. 
forecastingprinciples.com) are excellent resources for  
scientists and practitioners. I propose some ideas that  
they, and others, might consider for future research.  
 Their articles and websites provide descriptions of 
their methodologies and guidance for applying them.  
However, they may still leave practitioners uncertain  
on how to use the methodologies in their specific  
conflict situations. I encourage Green and Armstrong  
to continue to research the implementation of their  
methodologies, and thus to facilitate their practical  
use. Expanding their research to new problem sets  
and new study participants, for example, would be 
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one way to demonstrate the broader applicability  
of their methods. Practitioners could serve as part- 
ners in  the  research  process,  such  as  by assisting  
in developing conflict situations that have external  
validity. I also suggest that they use their websites  
as a forum for practitioners and researchers to share  
role-playing instructions, new conflict scenarios, and  
lessons learned when applying the methodologies.  
 Finally, many subject-matter experts do not have  
training in developing a forecast in a structured man- 
ner. Therefore, I suggest a slightly different line of  
research to focus on training experts. In addition to  
determining ways to obtain accurate forecasts with- 
out using experts, finding ways to train subject-matter  
experts in forecasting may prove valuable. 
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Comment: Experts Who Don’t Know They Don’t Know  
 
Jonathan J. Koehler  
McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station B6500, Austin, Texas 78712-0212,  
 koehler@mail.utexas.edu 
Sadly, the conclusion that Green and Armstrongreach—thatexpertsshouldnotbeusedforpredict- 
ing the conflict outcomes—is not a surprise. Decades  
ago, Armstrong taught us that expertise beyond a  
minimal level does not improve judgmental accu- 
racy across a variety of domains (Armstrong 1980).  
More recently, Tetlock (2005) drove home that point  
in a study of hundreds of political experts who made  
thousands of forecasts over many years. Like Green  
and Armstrong, Tetlock found the expert forecasts to  
be frequently inaccurate. In support of Armstrong’s  
previous work, Tetlock suggests that avid readers of  
The New York Times should be able to predict political  
events as well as highly trained experts.  
 Green and Armstrong also demonstrate that non- 
professionals mistakenly expect superior performance  
from  experts  relative  to  what  they  expect  from  
novices. Although it is true that neither novices nor  
experts were more accurate than guessing in eight  
conflict-prediction tasks, most study participants did  
not begin with high expectations of the experts. Par- 
ticipants expected experts to be accurate 45 percent  
of the time in tasks in which random guessing would  
yield  a  success  rate  of  approximately 28 percent. 
Although these expectations were higher than chance, 
they are hardly a high endorsement for the perceived 
value of using expert forecasters. 
However, if people really believe that experts are  
not good at predicting the future, why do we clamor  
for their  views? Perhaps, we find it comforting to  
be with those who are knowledgeable about things  
that concern us. By speaking to our concerns, experts  
may justify our anxieties. Perhaps, experts help us to  
organize problems in our minds by laying out the  
advantages and disadvantages of the options we face.  
Or, when we ourselves must make decisions, per- 
haps experts function largely as convenient sources  
of blame for decisions that turn out badly (e.g., poor  
investment choices). 
A question that may be more interesting than why 
we clamor for predictions from experts who disap- 
point  is  why experts  continue  to  offer  their  faux  
expertise.  The answer seems obvious: Experts pre- 
dict because we ask them and reward them well for  
doing so. Fame, influence, and riches are the spoils  
of those who answer the media’s incessant calls for  
forecasting expertise. However, I suspect that most  
experts genuinely believe in their forecasting skills. My  
suspicion may seem naïve in the face of consistent  
evidence that shows expert forecasters struggle to  
outperform novice forecasters and chance. Surely the  
experts know the data. They must know their own  
dismal records. Or, do they? My hunch is that they  
do not think their forecasting records are bad. Quite  
the contrary, they may believe that their records are  
outstanding. 
Psychological research shows that people seek, re- 
call, focus upon, and interpret evidence in ways that  
reinforce  existing  beliefs (Nisbett  and  Ross 1980). 
These cognitive biases reinforce our initial beliefs and  
prevent us from having to admit error or concede  
intellectual  ground.  If  conflict  experts  believe  that  
they are quite good at forecasting the resolution of  
certain types of conflicts, they may sustain their faith  
in their forecasting skills by remembering their cor- 
rect calls and misremembering their failures. Or, per- 
haps, they interpret and encode failures as successes.  
World events are complicated, and deciding whether  
a political forecast (as opposed to a weather forecast  
or a sports-contest forecast) is or is not correct can  
be a matter of judgment or wish. Were the experts  
and politicians  who said that  former  Iraqi  leader  
Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruc- 
tion immediately prior to the start of the 2003 United  
States-Iraq war correct? Most people think they were  
wrong. Others disagree, noting that Saddam Hussein  
did have those weapons at one time, that he used  
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them against his own people, and that he had the  
desire and means to obtain such weapons again. This  
defense is an example of what some philosophers  
refer to as a “fallacy of diversion” (Damer 1995), i.e.,  
an attempt to maneuver oneself into a more advan- 
tageous or less embarrassing intellectual position by  
focusing on peripheral matters. This may insulate  
forecasters from having to contemplate, let alone con- 
cede, error. 
Even when experts do concede forecast error, they  
may not alter their beliefs about their forecasting skills  
because they may find ways to minimize the import  
of their errors. As Tetlock  (2005) documents in his  
study of political forecasters, experts find ways to  
avoid conceding error—even when faced with an out- 
come other than they predicted. Paraphrasing Tet- 
lock’s detailed discussion, common defenses of failed  
predictions include:  (1) I was just off on timing—  
my predictions will eventually be borne out; (2) An  
improbable event occurred that changed the outcome; 
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(3) My reasoning was accurate; and (4) My error was  
the lesser of the two errors that one could have made. 
Green and Armstrong conclude on an optimistic  
note. They cite some of their other research, which  
shows that conflict-forecasting errors can be reduced 
when forecasters engage in role playing and draw  
upon analogies from previous conflicts. Until these  
and other decision aids are fully developed and in 
the cultural mainstream, we would be wise to bear 
in mind the two types of forecasters John Kenneth 
Galbraith identified: “Those who don’t know, and 
those who don’t know they don’t know.” 
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Comment: Factors Promoting Forecasting Accuracy 
Among Experts: Some Multimethod Convergence  
 
Philip E. Tetlock  
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, 545 Student Services Building #1900, Berkeley, California, 94720-1900,  
 tetlock@haas.berkeley.edu 
The findings that Green and Armstrong report arecompatiblewithmanyfindingsthatIdiscussed 
in  my recent book, Expert  Political  Judgment:  How  
Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Tetlock 2005). Like  
Green and Armstrong, I found little support for the  
usual hypotheses about factors often believed to influ- 
ence the accuracy of experts’ predictions.  When I  
examined approximately 28,000 predictions that 280  
experts made on the political and economic futures  
of approximately 60 countries, I too found no differ- 
ence in the accuracy of forecasts from: (1) experts ver- 
sus dilettantes;  (2) those with more experience and  
those with less; (3) experts from different disciplines  
(e.g.,  economists, political scientists);  (4) those with  
access to classified information and those without; 
 
(5) those with prestigious institutional affiliations and 
those without; (6) those who had lived for lengthy 
periods in the relevant country and those who had 
not; (7)  those  with and without relevant language 
skills;  (8) those who identified their ideology as lib- 
eral versus those who considered themselves to be 
conservative; (9) those who classified themselves as 
realists (who believe that in world politics, the strong 
do what they will and the weak accept what they 
must) versus those who classified themselves as insti- 
tutionalists (who believe that international  institu- 
tions  have some normative force not reducible to  
power politics); and (10) those whose temperamen- 
tal  self-identification  was  boomster-optimist  versus  
doomster-Malthusian. One of my conclusions was  
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that,  in  a  complex,  probabilistic  world,  we  reach  
the point of diminishing marginal-predictive returns  
for knowledge considerably more quickly than most  
experts—and most users of expertise—appreciate.  
 The findings of Green and Armstrong (2004) also  
agree with other findings I reported—findings that  
do  pass  conventional  levels  of  statistical  signifi- 
cance. Green and Armstrong (2004) found that an  
experimental manipulation that encouraged forecast- 
ers to use historical analogies in more sophisticated  
ways (e.g., a balanced appreciation for key differ- 
ences and similarities across the range of possible  
analogies) did produce significant increases in fore- 
casting  accuracy.  I  did  not,  however,  rely  on  any  
experimental manipulations of cognitive style; rather,  
I focused on naturally occurring individual variation  
among experts in their styles of reasoning. I mea- 
sured  variation  both  by  a  cognitive  style  scale—  
the hedgehog-Fox scale—and by content analysis of  
thought protocols that experts generated in support  
of  their  predictions.  These considerable differences  
in  methodology notwithstanding, I too found evi- 
dence that experts who use historical analogies in  
more flexible and balanced ways  (rather than just  
focusing on the salient points of similarity between  
the current situation and their favorite analogy) pro- 
vided significantly more accurate forecasts. Experts  
who used history predominantly to confirm their  
hypotheses made predictions that were too extreme.  
For instance, in 1992, it would have helped experts  
to be aware that although there were several sim- 
ilarities  between  North  Korea and Romania, there  
were also many important differences; these differ- 
ences were sufficient to lessen the subjective probabil- 
ity that the North Korean leadership would be over- 
thrown similar to how the Romanian leadership had  
been a few years earlier. In 2003, it might have helped  
to be aware that although there were several similar- 
ities  between the leadership of Saddam Hussein in  
Iraq and the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler, there were  
also  alternative,  less  ominous,  historical  analogies,  
including Italy  under Mussolini, the Soviet Union  
under Stalin, Romania under Ceausescu, Yugoslavia  
under Tito, and Egypt under Nasser. Using the alter- 
native  analogies  would have led one to expect a  
leadership in Iraq that was considerably more risk 
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averse  than  does  the  Nazi  analogy.  That  assess- 
ment, in turn, might well influence judgments about  
the subjective likelihood that Iraq would serve as a  
sponsor for international terrorist strikes against the  
United States. 
Finally, like Green and Armstrong, I find that even  
the good news about factors that promote forecast- 
ing accuracy tends to have some negative aspects: It  
is hard to raise expert forecasting accuracy apprecia- 
bly above that possible from simple statistical models.  
This is a recurring theme in the psychological litera- 
ture that has, over the last five decades, pitted clinical  
versus actuarial approaches to prediction against each  
other (Arkes 2001). 
If  experts’ predictions are as unimpressive as the  
results of Green and Armstrong and of my own work  
suggest, why is this fact not more widely appreci- 
ated? In politics, one obvious answer is that people  
are simply too partisan to notice the prediction fail- 
ures by the pundits on their side—even though they  
very much savor the prediction failures of opposition  
pundits. As research on cognitive consistency, per- 
formed over several decades, suggests (Abelson et al.  
1968), there is some truth to this conjecture.  
 In closing this commentary, I suggest a more unset- 
tling possibility. Imagine this symbiotic relationship.  
Experts have an obvious professional self-interest in  
sustaining the widespread impression that they pos- 
sess special knowledge about the future and should  
be frequently consulted. And, as I (1999, 2005) have  
reported, experts also have an impressive ability to  
redefine relatively inaccurate forecasts as relatively  
accurate by invoking belief-system defenses such as  
“just  off  on  timing” (be  patient,  x  has  not  hap- 
pened yet, but it will), the close-call counterfactual  
(be reasonable, x did not happen but it almost did  
and would have but for this exogenous shock that no  
one could have foreseen), and the “I-made-the-right- 
mistake”  (better  to  have  under- or over-estimated  
them than the opposite mistake). However, many  
social psychologists have argued, as I have (Tetlock  
2005), that people have a deep-rooted need to believe  
that they live in a predictable and controllable world,  
and reliance on expert judgment helps to sustain this  
comforting illusion. Consumers of expertise do not  
want to believe that in making important decisions—  
such as whether to go to war or to redirect economic  
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or trade policy—they could do just as well by rely- 
ing on simple, extrapolation algorithms or even coin 
tosses. Each side needs the other too much to disen- 
gage from the relationship merely because it is based 
on an illusion. 
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